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Means: Labor Law: The Effect of State Right-to-Work Laws on Agency Shop

CASE COMMENTS
LABOR LAW: THE EFFECT OF STATE RIGHT-TOWORK LAWS ON AGENCY SHOP AGREEMENTS
Local 1625, Int'l Assn of Retail Clerks
v. Schermerhorn,88 Sup. Ct. 1461 (1963)
Local 1625 of the International Association of Retail Clerks is the
properly constituted bargaining agent for the Florida employees of
Food Fair, Inc., a large chain grocery. A contract between the
company and the union provided that all employees who were not
members of the union "shall be required to pay as a condition of
employment, an initiation service fee and monthly service fees to the
union," such amounts to be equal to the initiation fees and monthly
dues that members of the union are required to pay. This device, a
relative newcomer to the family of union-security measures, is known
as the "agency shop." Its purpose is to exact financial support for
the bargaining agent from the nonmembers upon the theory that
those who stand to benefit from the union's bargaining efforts should
help to pay the cost. In short, the agency shop seeks to eliminate the
so-called "free-riders.f
Four nonunion employees of Food Fair brought action in the circuit
court for Dade County to enjoin the union from enforcing this agreement. They contended that the contract was in violation of the
right-to-work amendment of the Florida Constitution, which reads
in part:1
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged
on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor
union, or labor organization; provided, that this clause shall not
be construed to deny or abridge the right of employees by and
through a labor organization or labor union to bargain collectively with their employer.
The circuit court rejected the union's contention that it lacked
jurisdiction of the case by virtue of congressional preemption, but
went on to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the agency shop
agreement between the company and the union did not, as a matter
of law, violate the right-to-work amendment. 2
1. FLA. CONST. Deci. of Rights §12.
2. See Schermerhorn v. Local 1625, Int'l Ass'n of Retail Clerks, 141 So. 2d

269, 271 (Fla. 1962).
[487]

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1963

1

UNIVERSITY
LAW
REVIEW
Florida OF
LawFLORIDA
Review, Vol.
16, Iss.
3 [1963], Art.[Vol.
8 XV1

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed, 8 holding
that the agency shop device did violate Florida's right-to-work
amendment. Two justices dissented on jurisdictional grounds. After
noting that the authority for enacting state right-to-work laws derives
from the National Labor Relations Act,4 the court observed that:5
[I] t is not to be presumed that Congress would preserve to the
states the field of right-to-work legislation, while, at the same
time, intending that unions and management could, by the use
of subterfuge of an agency shop clause, circumvent and, in
effect, nullify a paramount provision of the organic law of any
of the several states.
On review by certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States
HELD, that under section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations
Act,6 the states do have authority to prohibit the agency shop.
Judgment affirmed, Mr. Justice Goldberg not participating in the
decision. 7
In view of the comprehensive character of existing federal legislation in the field of labor-management relations, those provisions of
the National Labor Relations Act s whieh authorize the State of
Florida to prohibit the agency shop must be examined.
The basic policy of the act concerning compulsory union membership is contained in section 79 and subsection 8(a)(3). 10 The former
guarantees to employees covered by the act the right to join or assist
labor organizations, or to refuse to do so. The latter makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to discriminate among employees by
encouraging or discouraging membership in any labor organization.
Thus, the act's policy is in a very general way directed against
compulsory unionism.
3. Schermerhom v. Local 1625, Int'l Ass'n of Retail Clerks, supra note 2.
4. National Labor Relations Act §14(b), as amended, 61 Stat. 151 (1947),

29 U.S.C. §164(b) (1962).
5. Schermerhorn v. Local 1625, Int'l Ass'n of Retail Clerks, supra note 2, at

273.
6. National Labor Relations Act §14(b), as amended, 61 Stat. 151 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §164(b) (1962).
7. Local 1625, Int'l Ass'n of Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 83 Sup. Ct. 1461

(1963).
8. National Labor Relations Act §§7, 8(a)(3), 14(b), as amended, 61 Stat.
140, 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§157, 158(a)(3), 164(b) (1962).
9. National Labor Relations Act §7, as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29

U.S.C. §157 (1962).
10. National Labor Relations Act §8(a) (3), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) (1962).
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However, care has nonetheless been taken not to preclude resort
to compulsory membership agreements negotiated in certain prescribed circumstances. For this purpose a proviso was added to
subsection 8(a)(3), to the effect that: 11
nothing in this subehapter.., shall preclude an employer
from making an agreement with a labor organization (not
established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in
this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a
condition of employment membership therein on or after the
thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or
the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later,
(i) if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title . . . and

(ii) unless following an election.., the Board shall have
certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to
vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of
such labor organization to make such an agreement ...
But, neither was it intended that the quoted proviso should have
the effect of altogether precluding the state prohibition of compulsory
12
unionism. Therefore, section 14(b) was included, providing that:
nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the
execution or application of agreements requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any
State or Territory in which such execution or application is
prohibited by State or Territorial law.
It is clear that the last-quoted section in effect authorizes the
states to prohibit the so-called union shop. Whether it also authorizes
them to prohibit the agency shop was the issue presented in the
Schermerhorn case. This was a question of first impression for the
United States Supreme Court, although it had previously arisen in
at least one lower federal court' 3 and two state appellate courts.14 In
11. ibid.
12. National Labor Relations Act §14(b), as amended, 61 Stat. 151 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §164(b) (1962).
13. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno
Stage Line, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 726 (D. Nev. 1962), in which an agency shop

agreement was held to be violative of Nevada's right-to-work law.
14. Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959),

in which an agency shop agreement was held not to be violative of the Indiana
right-to-work law; Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P2d 456
(1961), in which an agency shop agreement was held to be violative of the

Kansas right-to-work law.
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none of these cases, however, had it actually been held that the states
had no authority to prohibit the agency shop.
Analysis of the Schermerhorn decision will be aided by first noting
the various possible dispositions that were available to the Court.
Consistent with the above-quoted provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, there were at least three possible dispositions
open to the Court:
(1) that the authority of the states under the section 8(a) (3)
proviso allowing prohibition of the union shop also included the
authority to prohibit the agency shop;
(2) conversely, that authority to prohibit the agency shop was
not so included within the purview of the proviso; or,
(8) that the question posed could never arise in a state having
a right-to-work law, since in those jurisdictions, an agency shop
agreement would constitute an unfair labor practice under sections
7 and 8(a) (3) of the act itself.
All three were respectable possibilities.
Understanding the Court's decision in the Schermerhorn case will
be aided further by taking notice of a closely related decision handed
down the same day in N.L.R.B. v. General Motors Corporation.15
The question presented in that case was whether, in a state having
a right-to-work law that had been held16 not to prohibit an agency
shop agreement, the company had committed an unfair labor practice
by refusing to negotiate for such an agreement. The company argued
that the section 8(a) (8) proviso specifically spelled out the only
type of agreement-a union shop agreement' 7-that would not violate
the rights of employees or that would expose an employer to a charge
of engaging in an unfair labor practice. The union, on the other
hand, argued that the proviso merely set the outer limits of permissible
union security provisions and thus less rigorous devices, such as the
agency shop, were certainly permissible.
At the initial hearing on the union's charge of unfair labor practice,
8
the National Labor Relations Board held in favor of the company.'
However, upon rehearing (granted after the appointment of two new
members to the Board), the Board reversed its position and held for
15. 83 Sup. Ct. 1453 (1963).
16. Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, supra note 14.
17. A union shop agreement is well recognized as one which "does not require
an applicant to be a member of the union before he is hired, but it does require
him to join, and usually to continue his membership in the union after he is hired .
." Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan 11, 16, 360 P.2d 456, 461 (1961).
18. General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 481 (1961).
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the union.19 The court of appeals then reversed the Board, 20 holding
that since the agency shop was a very different thing from the union
shop, it could not be understood as having been authorized by the
proviso to section 8(a) (8). On appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed.
Observing that for present purposes the difference between the agency
and union shops was "more formal than real,"2 1 the Court held that
the agency shop was a permissible form of union security. In other
words, the company was bound to enter upon the proposed negotiations, and its refusal to do so constituted an unfair labor practice
22
under the act.
Mr. Justice White wrote the opinions in both the General Motors
and the Schermerhorn cases. The Schermerhorn opinion recognized
the close connection between these two cases by expressly placing
its rationale upon the authority of General Motors, that the agency
shop was the "practical equivalent" of the union shop.23 However,
closer reflection upon the choice the Court made from the various
dispositions that were available to it leads one to wonder whether the
two cases were not even more closely connected in the Court's reasoning than this application of the doctrine of precedent would indicate.
In short, the question is raised whether the Court did not actually
decide these two cases as a unit-at least to the extent that the reasoning of the Schermerhorn opinion might have been fashioned partly
to justify the rather more important holding of the General Motors
case.
The Court's determination that there is no practical difference
between the union and agency shops evidences a clear-cut rejection
of the second of the dispositions that were available in Schermerhorn,
as listed above. Of the two remaining possibilities, only one, the first,
was consistent with the outcome announced in General Motors; the
other, the third, quite obviously was not. In other words, the
Schermerhorn holding that the agency and union shops were practical
equivalents for the purpose of determining state authority under
section 14(b) was quite consistent with the General Motors holding
that they were equivalent for the purpose of determining the scope
of the dispensation contained in the section 8(a) (3) proviso. But,
19. General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 451 (1961).
20. General Motors Corp. v. NLEB, 303 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1962).
21. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 83 Sup. Ct. 1453, 1460 (1963).
22. National Labor Relations Act §8(a)(5), as amended, 61 Stat. 141 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §158(a)(5) (1962), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ......
23. Local 1625, Int'l Ass'n Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, supra note 7, at
1465.
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conversely, a Schermerhorn holding that passage of a state right-towork law simply nullified the operation of the section 8(a) (8) proviso
in the respective state, though producing the same result in that case,
would have required an opposite holding in General Motors.
Admittedly, the hypothesis that these two cases were decided
more or less as a unit derives but little support from the mere circumstance that in Schermerhorn, the Court selected from the available
rationales the one that would be consistent with the General Motors
holding. However, additional support can be seen in certain
circumstances that appear when the two opinions are jointly considered. For one thing, that the Court gave a high priority to the
General Motors outcome is suggested by its willingness in that case
to hold that the agency and union shops were practical equivalents,
even while relying heavily on a state court holding that the two
devices were so different that the state right-to-work law prohibited
24
one but not the other.
A similar inconsistency results from the same holding in Schermerhorn. In other words, one result of the Court's holding that the two
devices are practical equivalents will be to leave the way open for
state courts construing state right-to-work laws either to agree with
that holding or to hold, to the contrary, that these devices are so
different that their law prohibits one but not the other. In this
particular case, the view of the Florida Supreme Court coincided
with the holding being discussed. However, the Florida trial court,
in Schermerhorn, and the Indiana appellate court, in Meade Electric
Co. v. Hagberg2 5 took the contrary view.
Perhaps most compelling in support of the notion that General
Motors and Schermerhorn were decided together is the fact that the
rationale underlying the third of the possible dispositions of Schermerhorn, to the effect that passage of a state right-to-work law simply
nullifies the operation of the section 8(a) (8) proviso, was not dealt
with in either of the two opinions. 26 This seems strange by any
standard, when it is considered: (1) that this was the view of the
majority of the National Labor Relations Board in the first hearing
24. Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, supra note 14.
25. 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959).
26. The closest the Court came to recognizing the existence of this viewpoint
'was in the General Motors case, 83 Sup. Ct. 1453, 1460-61 (1963), where it said:
"Whether a different result obtains in states which have declared such arrangement unlawful is an issue still to be resolved in Retail Clerks Union v. Schermerhorn, 83 Sup. Ct. 1461, and one which is of no relevance here because Indiana
law does not forbid the present contract proposal. In the context of this case,
then, the employer cannot justify his refusal to bargain." This degree of recognition assuredly rules out any possibility of oversight.
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